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IS THE RULE OF NECESSITY REALLY NECESSARY 
IN STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 
THE CENTRAL PANEL SOLUTION 
ARNOLD ROCHVARG* 
I. Introduction 
It is well established that the due process right to a hearing 
includes the right that the decisionmaker be impartiaJ.2 This applies not 
only to judicial proceedings, but quasi-judicial administrative 
proceedings as well.3 In fact, it has been stated that of all the rights 
encapsulated within due process, the requirement of an impartial 
decisionmaker is the most important because without that right, the 
other rights become meaningless.4 
The likelihood of a biased decisionmaker is higher in state 
administrative hearings than in federal administrative hearings. While 
cases do exist where federal agency decisions have been challenged 
based on bias,5 the federal cases are greatly out numbered 
by cases at the state level attacking agency decisions due to bias, many 
of which conclude that disqualifying bias does exist. While in part the 
discrepancy in the number of cases alleging bias between the federal 
and state courts is attributable to the larger number of administrative 
·~rofessor, University of Baltimore School of Law 
2Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 
(1955); General Motors Corp. v. Rosa, 82 N.Y. 2d 183,624 N.E.2d 142,604 N.Y.S. 2d 14 
(1993); First American Bank & Trust Co. v. Ellwein, 221 N.W. 2d 509 (N.D. 1974). Michael 
Asimow, Toward A New California Administrative Procedure Act: Adjudication 
Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L.Rev. 1067, 1143 (1992). 
3Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982); Regan v. Board of Chiropractic 
Examiners, 355 Md. 397, 735 A. 2d 991 (\999); Christopher B. McNeil, Similarities and 
Difforences Between Judges In the Judicial Branch and the Executive Branch, 18 JNAALJ 1 
(1998). 
4 Ann M. Young, Evaluation 0/ Administrative Law Judges: Premises, Means and 
Ends, 17 1.NAALJ 1, 29 (1997), citing Martin H. Redish & Laurence C. Marshall, 
Adjudicatory Independence and the Values o/Procedural Due Process, 95 Yale L. 1. 455, 456-
57 (1986). 
sSee, e.g., Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 
1970); Texaco v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated on other grounds, 381 U.S. 739 
(1965). 
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hearings at the local level, also significant is the fact that local agency 
decisionmakers are more likely to be personally familiar with the 
parties and facts involved in the cases they decide as compared to their 
federal counterparts. It is much more likely therefore that allegations 
of personal, financial, and prejudgment bias of state agency officials 
will be successfully made in state courts. 
An exception exists to the requirement that decisionmakers be 
unbiased and impartial. This exception, known as the rule of necessity, 
provides that even if disqualifying bias exists, the biased 
decisionmakers can still decide the case if they are the only authority 
empowered to make the decision. Despite the tension this exception 
creates with the due process right to an impartial decisionmaker, it has 
been relied upon by a significant number of cases from state courts. 
The purpose of this article is to discuss the rule of necessity as 
it has been applied to state administrative agencies, and discuss the 
different approaches that have been offered to avoid its application. 
The article will show that state courts have relied on the rule of 
necessity liberally, and have thus tolerated biased administrative 
decisionmaking. The article will argue that the current alternative 
solutions to the use of the rule of necessity are inadequate. The article 
will then propose that mandatory referral to central panels of 
administrative law judges be utilized as the best solution to the bias-rule 
of necessity issue. 
II. The Rule of Necessity 
The rule of necessity is a common law doctrine which permits a 
judge to decide a case despite the judge's personal interest or bias in the 
matter if there is no provision for appointment of another judge to decide 
the case.6 The leading case in the United States discussing the rule of 
necessity is United States v. Wilf which involved a challenge by thirteen 
federal district court judges to statutes which had the effect of reducing 
the compensation of all federal judges by changing the formula for 
annual cost of living increases. Even though every federal judge had a 
personal financial interest in the outcome of this case, because it was not 
61n re Doe, 2 F. 3d 308 (8th Cir. 1993); Reily v. SEPTA, 330 Pa Super. 420, 479 A. 
2d 973 (1984); Bliss v. Tyler, 149 Mich. 601,113 N.W. 317 (1907). 
7449 U.S. 200 (1980). 
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possible to obtain a disinterested judge, the rule of necessity was 
invoked, and the case was decided by persons who would be personally 
impacted by the decision. The Supreme Court in Will noted that the rule 
of necessity had been recognized as early as 1430,8 and had been "so 
[taken] for granted" that the Supreme Court had never made "express 
reference to it" or felt that "extended discussion of it was needed."9 In 
Will, the Court further noted that the rule of necessity had "been 
consistently applied in this country in both state and federal COurtS."IO 
Even though the rule of necessity developed as a common law doctrine 
relating to the disqualification of judges, it has also been applied to 
administrative proceedings where the administrative agency is acting in 
a quasi-judicial capacity. II 
In practice, the rule of necessity has not played a significant role 
in federal administrative law. The only major federal administrative law 
case discussing the rule of necessity is Cement Institute v. Federal Trade 
Commission. 12 In Cement Institute, the target of a FTC unfair trade 
practice adjudication argued that the FTC had prejudged the case. The 
prejudgment contention was based on earlier reports filed by the FTC 
with Congress and the President concerning pricing practices in the 
cement industry which had concluded that the cement industry's 
prevalent pricing system constituted an illegal restraint of trade. In 
Cement Institute, the Supreme Court held that just because the FTC had 
reached a particular conclusion as a result of its own non-adversarial 
investigation did not mean that the FTC had prejudged the case which 
was now before it. \3 Disqualification on account of prejUdgment bias 
therefore was not appropriate. 
Although the Supreme Court had expressly held that no 
disqualifying prejudgment bias existed on the part of the FTC, the 
BId at 213. 
'1d at 216. The Supreme Court had earlier applied the rule of necessity in Evans v. 
Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920). Evans was a federal district court judge who sued for a refund of 
his federal income taxes. He argued that Congress had no power to tax the compensation of 
federal judges. Even though every federal judge had a direct personal financial interest in the 
outcome of this case, the case was decided by federal judges. 
10449 U.S. at 214. 
liSee, e.g., Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F. 2d 351 (10th Cir. 1936); First American Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Ellwein, 221 N.W. 2d 509 (N.D. 1974); and cases discussed in Section III. 
12333 U.S. 683 (1948). 
I3Id. at 700-703. 
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Supreme Court nevertheless discussed the rule of necessity. 14 Because 
the FTC was the only agency empowered to decide an unfair trade 
practice case, if the FTC were to be disqualified, the purposes of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act would be defeated. IS Alleged price fixers 
who had been the subject of statutorily required reports to Congress 
would be free to violate the law because no one would be able to enforce 
the law. The solution in such a situation was to allow the FTC to decide 
the adjudication even if guilty of prejudgment bias. 
The Supreme Court's Cement Institute discussion of the rule of 
necessity is the only significant federal court discussion of the doctrine 
as applied to a federal administrative agency. The Supreme Court's 
discussion of the rule of necessity was totally unnecessary since the Court 
had earlier held that no disqualifying prejudgment bias existed. In 
contrast, to the federal experience, however, there are many cases from 
state courts concerning state administrative agencies where disqualifying 
bias was found, yet, relying on the rule of necessity, the state court 
permitted the biased state agency decisionmakers to decide the case. The 
rule of necessity, therefore, although recognized at the federal level, has 
much greater significance in state administrative law. 
III. Application of the Rule of Necessity to State Administrative 
Agencies 
To illustrate the significance of the rule of necessity in state 
administrative law, this section will discuss some of the significant cases 
from various states where the doctrine was applied to permit biased state 
administrative decisionmakers to decide cases. 
Barker v. Secretary of State's Office of Missouri 16 involved a 
worker's compensation claim. At the initial hearing before an 
administrative law judge, the claimant's employer and the employer's 
insurance company were represented by attorney Hannelore Fischer. 
After the administrative law judge ruled in favor of the employer, an 
appeal was taken to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. 
Between the time of the initial hearing and the appeal to the Commission, 
14Id. at 70 I. 
'SId. 
16752 S.W. 2d 437 (Mo. App. 1988). 
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Hannelore Fischer was appointed chair of the Commission. 17 The 
Commission affirmed the administrative law judge's denial of benefits by 
a 2-1 vote, with Fischer in the majority. Fischer issued a separate 
statement in which she wrote that she had taken no part in the case until 
after the other two commissioners had deadlocked. Despite Fischer's 
earlier involvement as counsel in the case, the Missouri Court of Appeals 
upheld Fischer's participation and vote as part of the Commission's 
review by invoking the rule of necessity. 18 
Adkins v. City of Tell City, Indianal9 involved a challenge by a 
police officer to his removal from the police force. The allegations of 
wrongdoing involved the police officer's sexual activity with a sixteen 
year old while on duty and in uniform. The Board of Safety, the agency 
empowered to remove police officers, first heard evidence of the sexual 
misconduct at a meeting which was held without the police officer's 
presence and without placing any witness under oath or subject to cross 
examination.20 Subsequent to this first meeting, the board met in 
executive session, again outside the accused police officer's presence to 
further consider the charges. At the executive session, the Board voted 
to discharge the police officer. 2 I Ten days later, however, the Board 
rescinded the discharge because of the lack of procedural regularity of its 
earlier actions, and scheduled a public hearing on the charges. Shortly 
thereafter, a public hearing was held which provided the required 
procedural protections. 22 After this public hearing, the Board voted to 
discharge the police officer for improper conduct while on duty. 
The discharged police officer challenged the Board's discharge 
decision on the ground that the Board members should have been 
disqualified because they had been irreparably prejudiced by the ex parte 
information received at the earlier procedurally defective sessions.23 
Interestingly, the Indiana Court of Appeals agreed with the police officer 
that the Board's exposure to the "grave charges" prior to the procedurally 
I7Id. at 438. 
IBId. at 439. 
19625 N.E. 2d 1298 (Ind. Ct. of Appeals, 1993). 
2°Id. at 1301. 
21Id. 
22 At this hearing, witnesses were under oath, subject to cross examination, and a 
proper record was created. Id. 
23Id. at 1303. 
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proper public hearing warranted the disqualification of the entire Board,z4 
However, because no other body had the authority to remove a police 
officer, the rule of necessity was applied, and the court upheld the 
Board's decision to remove the police officer.25 
In Gay v. City of Somerville, Tennessee,26 a chief of police 
challenged his dismissal on the basis of prejudgment bias. In this case, 
prior to the hearing on the chief s removal, members of the deciding 
agency, the Board of Mayor and Aldermen, had told the city 
administrator to begin accepting applications for the position of chief of 
police.27 Moreover, it was alleged that the mayor, who was a voting 
member of the Board, had told others prior to the hearing that "it was 
pretty well a done deal," and that "there was no way in hell" the present 
police chief would keep his job.28 The Tennessee Court of Appeals held 
that there was sufficient evidence of bias on the part of the Board;29 
however, because the Board was the only agency authorized to make the 
decision whether the chief of police was to be removed, it was 
"appropriate to apply the Rule ofNecessity.,,30 
Removal of a police officer was also the issue in Siteman v. City 
of Allentown, Pennsylvania. 31 Seven months after being first informed of 
his proposed discharge, the police officer at a meeting of the Allentown 
City Council objected to the lack of sufficiently detailed notice of the 
charges against him.32 Based on this objection, the city council ordered 
the police department to provide more information. In response, the 
police department filed a brief which included exhibits which it was 
argued caused the members of the council to be prejudiced against the 
officer.33 A city council meeting was thereafter convened where two of 
the seven council members recused themselves. The council then voted 
3-2 to dismiss all charges.34 Two days later, however, the council 
24Id. 
25Id. at 1304. 
26878 S.W. 2d 124 (Tenn. Ct. of Appeals, 1994). 
27Id. at 127. 
2aId. at 127n. 3. 
29Id. at 128. 
30Id. 
31695 A.2d. 888 (Pa. Comm.Ct. 1997). 
32Id. at 889. 
33Id. 
34Id. 
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reconsidered, and voted 3-2 to hold further hearings on the matter. The 
next day, another council member recused himself, as did another council 
member a few weeks later.35 
Only three of the seven council members were now left. The rules 
of the Allentown City Council required a quorum of four. Nevertheless, 
the remaining three council members held evidentiary hearings on the 
charges against the police officer, and eventually voted 3-0 for removal.36 
Faced with this unusual set of circumstances, the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court invoked the rule of necessity, and remanded the 
case for a new hearing before the entire city council including members 
who had recused themselves.37 
In Acme Brick Company v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company,38 
a petition was filed with the Arkansas Highway Commission by a railroad 
requesting permission to discontinue a spur track which serviced the brick 
company's factory. When the brick company learned that counsel for the 
railroad was simultaneously representing the Commission and its 
members in two other lawsuits, the brick company sought disqualification 
of the Commissioners. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that "the 
representation of both [the railroad] and the Commissioners by [the same] 
counsel created an appearance of bias or impropriety on the 
Commission's part mandating their recusal from consideration of [the 
railroad's] petition."39 However, because there was no procedure for 
appointment of replacements to hear the matter, the rule of necessity was 
invoked, and the commissioners were allowed to decide the railroad's 
petition.40 
The rule of necessity was also invoked in an Illinois case 
involving both fmancial and prejudgment bias concerning the expansion 
of a landfill.41 E & E Hauling had a contract to operate a landfill with 
DuPage County and the DuPage Forest Preserve District. In April 1981, 
E & E Hauling and the Forest Preserve District agreed to seek an 
HId. at 890. 
36Id. 
37Id. at 891-92. 
38307 Ark. 363, 821 S.W. 2d. 7 (1991). 
39821 S.W. 2d at 10. 
4°Id. at II. 
41E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 116 Ill. App. 3d 586, 451 N.E. 2d 
555 (1983). 
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expansion of the landfill, and in September 1981, they jointly filed a 
petition with the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEP A) which 
at that time had the authority to approve requests for landfill 
modifications.42 Also in October 1981, the DuPage County Board passed 
an ordinance giving its approval to the proposed expansion. 
Significantly, by statute, the members of the DuPage County Board also 
served as the commissioners of the DuPage Forest Preserve District. 
In November 1981, the Illinois State General Assembly amended 
the Illinois Environmental Protection Act to transfer responsibility for 
deciding landfill modifications from the IEP A to the relevant local 
authority, which in this case was the DuPage County Board.43 In 1982, 
pursuant to the new authority granted to it by the 1981 amendment, the 
DuPage County Board held a hearing and voted to approve the landfill 
modification. 
Opponents of the landfill expansion challenged the County 
Board's approval on various grounds including financial bias because the 
Forest Preserve District received a percentage of the fees E & E Hauling 
received from the waste deposited at the landfill,44 and on prejudgment 
bias because the County Board had earlier passed an ordinance approving 
the expansion.45 
The Illinois Appellate Court held that the County Board suffered 
a disqualifying conflict of interest. The increased royalty revenue to 
Forest Preserve District was "undeniably substantial"46 which the court 
believed could improperly influence the County Board members who 
were also commissioners of the Forest Preserve District. Moreover, the 
County Board members had a disqualifying prejudgment bias because in 
their role as District Commissioners, they had approved the modification, 
were co-applicants with E & E Hauling in the petition to the IEP A, and. 
had applied to the County Board for its approva1.47 In their role as 
County Board members, they had approved the expansion during the 
pendency of the application before the IEPA.48 Despite all this evidence 
42451 N.E. 2d at 559. 
43Id. at 561. 
44Id. at 562. 
4sId. 
46Id. at 565. 
47Id. at 566. 
48Id. 
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of bias, the court upheld the County Board's approval of the landfill 
modification. The court said that this was a "true case of necessity"49 
because the County Board was the sole body empowered to make the 
decision. 
A condemnation decision as part of a city's eminent domain 
power was the center of the controversy in Kunec v. Brea Redevelopment 
Agency.5o In order to exercise the City of Brea, California's power of 
eminent domain, an affirmative vote of four of the five council members 
was required. A problem existed, however, in that two of the council 
members had property or financial interests adjacent to the property 
which was subject of the condemnation resolution. In order to get four 
votes, the two conflicted council members flipped a coin to decide which 
one .should vote. After the coin toss, the council approved the resolution 
4-0. The owner of the condemned property challenged the council's 
decision. The California Court of Appeal upheld the council's reliance 
on a California statuteS I which essentially codified the rule of necessity. 
The court held that it was proper for one of the biased council members 
to vote on the resolution in order to obtain the four votes needed to pass 
the resolution.52 
Borough of Fanwood v. ROCC053 involved an application to 
transfer a liquor license to a location which was about one block from the 
Fanwood Presbyterian Church. Under New Jersey's system of liquor 
control, the initial power to decide a liquor license matter was vested with 
the local municipal body with a right of appeal to the state Division of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control. 54 In this case, the initial hearing was held 
before the Fanwood Borough Council. Included in the hearing record 
was a letter from the Fanwood Presbyterian Church expressing its view 
that the application should be denied. 
The borough council voted to deny the liquor license transfer. 
49Id. at 567. 
5°55 Cal. App. 4th 511, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143 (1997). 
51California Government Code § 87101; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 18701, subd. (a). 
52The court ordered a remand to the council because it had failed to make full public 
disclosure in the minutes of the meeting why the council members had a conflict, and failed 
to explain on the same public record why there were no alternative decisionmakers available 
as required by the California statute. 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148-149. 
5333 N.J. 404, 165 A.2d 183 (I 960}. 
54 165 A. 2d at 188-189. 
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When challenging this decision in court, the applicant challenged the 
fairness of the decision because five of the six members of the borough 
council were members of the Fanwood Presbyterian Church. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court stated that the proper course would have been for 
these five members not to have decided the application because it is 
"important that the appearance of objectivity and impartiality be 
maintained as well as their actuality."55 However, because 
disqualification of the five council members would have left no quorum, 
the rule of necessity was followed, and disqualification was not ordered. 56 
Stroudsburg Area School District v. KellyS7 applied the rule of 
necessity to order a self proclaimed biased school board to vote on a 
school principal's dismissal. Pursuant to Pennsylvania law,58 a 2/3 vote 
of the school board was required to remove a school principal. Prior to 
any hearing on her dismissal, Kelly challenged the participation of three 
board members against whom Kelly had earlier filed a civil rights 
action. 59 Another bias problem existed with a different school board 
member who had openly supported Kelly by publicly wearing a green 
ribbon, and had been quoted in the newspaper as against Kelly's 
removal.60 The school board on its own motion voted that it could not 
provide a fair and impartial hearing.61 Nevertheless, relying on the rule 
of necessity, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed this 
decision by the school board, and ordered it to hold a hearing and decide 
whether Kelly should be removed as principa1.62 
A public school board decision to dismiss a teacher was involved 
in Danroth v. Mandaree Public School District Number 36.63 The 
dismissed teacher argued that she had been denied a fair and impartial 
hearing because the spouse of one of the school board members was the 
moving force behind the dismissal. The spouse had publicly threatened 
to withdraw her child from the school if the teacher was retained.64 The 
"Id. at 190. 
s6Id. 
s7701 A,2d 1000 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1997). 
s824 Pa. Stat. § 11·1129. 
s9701 A,2d at 1001. 
6OId. 
61Id. 
62Id. at 1002·03. 
63320 N.W. 2d 780 (N.D. 1982). 
64Id. at 783. 
Fall 1999 The Rule of Necessity 45 
North Dakota Supreme Court relied in part on the rule of necessity to 
affirm the teacher's dismissal despite the participation of the board 
member who was the spouse of the complaining party.6S 
Fitzgerald v. City of Maryland Heights, Missouri,66 involved the 
impeachment of a mayor by the city council. The mayor challenged the 
participation of three council members on the basis of bias because each 
had been accused earlier by the mayor of various acts of serious personal 
wrongdoing.67 The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the past 
accusations by the mayor against these three council members "would 
lead reasonable people ... to question the councilman's impartiality,'>68 and 
that the "appearance of bias created by this evidence should have been 
avoided ifpossible."69 Nevertheless, because disqualification of the three 
council members would have made it impossible to obtain the required 
2/3 vote of the eight member council, the court applied the rule of 
necessity to uphold the mayor's removapo 
In each case just discussed, the subject of the administrative 
decision was denied the right to an impartial and unbiased decisionmaker 
because of the court's invocation of the rule of necessity. 
Besides the cases just discussed in which reliance on the rule of 
necessity was deemed essential by the court in order to uphold the agency 
decision, there are other cases where the court, although holding that no 
disqualifying bias existed, nevertheless went on to hold that even if it had 
found disqualifying bias, it would not have ordered disqualification 
because it would have invoked the rule of necessity. Examples of cases 
that fall within this group include a case involving alleged prejudgment 
bias on the part of the Michigan Public Service Commission;71 a case 
65Id. at 783-84. 
66796 S.W. 2d 52 (Mo. App. 1990). 
670ne council member was accused of a conflict of interest in voting on a solid waste 
ordinance while he owned a solid waste hauling business. Another was accused of drunk 
driving and resisting arrest. The third was accused of trying to fix a speeding ticket. 769 S. W. 
2d at 60. 
68796 S. W. 2d at 60. 
69Id. 
7°Id. 
7lChampion's Auto Ferry, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 231 Mich. 
App. 699, 588 N.W. 2d 153 (1998). The prejudgment bias allegation was based on the state 
agency's participation in a proceeding before the federal Interstate Commerce Commission 
involving the same petitioner. 
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involving alleged personal and financial bias on the part of the Maryland 
Board of Chiropractic Examiners;72 a case involving a medical review 
panel in California involving alleged prejudgment bias; 73 a case 
involving the Pennsylvania Department of Insurance and alleged 
prejudgment of wrongdoing by an insurance agent;74 a case involving the 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission and alleged personal bias;75 a case 
involving a public school board in North Dakota and alleged prejudgment 
in a teacher removal; 76 two cases from Missouri, one involving a board 
of education and an allegation of financial bias,77 and the other involving 
removal of a mayor by a city council accused of politically motivated 
prejudgment; 78 and a case involving an Illinois board of police 
commissioners and an allegation of prejudgment,19 Although in each case, 
the court's ruling on the rule of necessity was not necessary to its 
decision to uphold the agency's decision, each case clearly constitutes 
authority for the application of the rule of necessity in cases where actual 
bias can be proven. 
There is also a group of cases where the court skipped the issue 
72Regan v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 120 Md. App. 494, 707 A. 2d 891 (Md. 
1998), affinned, 355 Md. 397, 735 A.2d 991 (1999). The allegation of personal bias was based 
on claims that the target of the board's investigation sought to compromise board members by 
asking two women to have sexual relations with them. The allegation of financial bias was 
based on the fact that board members had personal chiropractic practices in the same 
geographic area as the chiropractor whose license was subject to revocation. 
73Hongsathavij v. Queen of AngelsIHollywood Presbyterian Medical Center, 62 Cal. 
App.4th 1123,73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 695 (1998). The allegation of prejudgment bias was based on 
the combination of investigatory, prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions of the same board. 
74Sherman v. Kaiser, 644 A. 2d 221 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1995). The allegation of 
prejudgment bias was based on a report and a press release that concluded that violations had 
occurred. 
75Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 873 P.2d 
1001 (Okla. 1994). The alleged personal bias was based on a commissioner's public 
announcement that he had been acting as a secret FBI infonnant regarding the conduct of other 
commissioners and Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 
760pdahl v. Zeeland Public School District No.4, 512 N.W. 2d 444 (N.D. 1994). 
77Westbrook v. Board of Education of the City ofSt. Louis, 724 S.W. 2d 698 (Mo. 
App. 1987). The alleged financial bias was based on the Board's desire to avoid litigation with 
the family of a student who drowned during a school trip supervised by teachers whose 
discharge was sought. 
78Powell v. Wallace, 718 S.W.2d 545 (Mo.Appeals, 1986). 
79Collura v. Board of Police Commissioners of the Village of Itasca, 135 Ill. App. 3d 
827,482 N.E. 2d 143 (1985). The allegation of prejudgment bias was based on the board's 
prior exposure to polygraph results. 
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whether there was any disqualifying bias, and resolved the case merely 
by directly invoking the rule of necessity. For example, in Northeast 
Occupational Exchange, Inc. v. Bureau of RehabilitationSO a vocational 
rehabilitation facility was decertified by the Maine agency in charge of 
administering programs for handicapped individuals. One challenge to 
the decertification decision was that it was the product of prejudgment 
bias. In response, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that it need not 
consider whether the decisionmakers should in fact have been 
disqualified based on bias; the rule of necessity required the matter to be 
resolved by the only agency official empowered to decide the case even 
ifhe was biased and had prejudged the case.S1 Cases from other states 
have also taken this approach.s2 
All of these cases in this section demonstrate the vitality of the 
rule of necessity in state administrative law, and the willingness of state 
courts to invoke the doctrine to uphold decisions made by biased agency 
officials. 
IV. Refusal to Invoke the Rule of Necessity 
In contrast to the large number of cases from many states 
invoking the rule of necessity, there are only a few cases where the 
doctrine could have been invoked, but the court based on some notion of 
fairness, refused to invoke it. 
In Board of Education of Community Consolidated High School 
District Number 230, Cook County v. Illinois Educational Labor 
Relations Bowd. 83 a hearing officer's initial decision regarding the 
definition of an employee bargaining unit was appealed to a three 
member board. The Board at first reversed the hearing officer's decision 
by a vote of 2-1, but shortly after this vote, one of the board members 
who had voted in the majority, recused himself because ofa conflict of 
8°473 A.2d 406 (Maine 1984). 
BlId at 411. 
82See, Mosman v. Mathison, 90 Idaho 76, 408 P. 2d 450 (1965) (allegation of 
personal interest of member of State Board of Highway Directors who owned property adjacent 
to road whose abandonment was sought); Yuhas v. Board of Medical Examiners, 135 Mont. 
381,339 P. 2d 981 (1959) (allegation of prejudgment bias in case involving unprofessional and 
unethical conduct by medical doctor). 
83 165 III. App. 3d 41,518 N.E. 2d 713 (1987). 
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interest in the case.84 The two remaining board members, faced with a I-
I tie, agreed to allow the hearing officer's decision to become the final 
agency decision but without precedential value. The party who had lost 
at the hearing officer level (the school board) argued to the court that the 
rule of necessity should be invoked, and that the recused board member's 
original vote should be counted.8s The Illinois court disagreed. The court 
first stated that it did not believe that the rule of necessity should operate 
to break a tie vote.86 Moreover, the court reasoned, there really was no 
tie vote -- the two remaining board members both agreed to permit the 
hearing officer's decision to stand.87 
Another case where the court did not accept the invitation to 
invoke the rule of necessity was Clisham v. Board of Public 
Commissioners of the Borough of NaugatucJc88 which involved the 
removal of the police chief. The town charter of Naugatuck, Connecticut 
required the unanimous vote of the five members of the board of police 
commissioners to remove the police chief.89 All five members voted to 
remove Clisham. Upon hearing Clisham's appeal, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court held that one commissioner was guilty of improper 
prejudgment bias by his earlier repeated public statements that Clisham 
should be removed from office.90 However, rather than invoke the rule 
of necessity, which the Board had argued was the proper solution if the 
court found disqualifying bias,91 the court ordered a remand for a new 
hearing before an impartial panel.92 The court wrote that "It would be a 
miscarriage of justice to uphold the board's actions in this instance 
merely because the town has not provided a procedure for replacing 
disqualified board members. There can be no public confidence in a 
decision rendered by a board" infected with prejudgment bias.93 The 
84518 N.E. 2d at 715. 
85518 N.E. 2d at 717. 
86518 N.E. 2d at 717-718, citing 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedures 
§ I (b) (1983). Compare, Barker v. Secretaty of State's Office of Missouri, 752. S.W. 2d 437 
(Mo. App. 1988). 
87518 N.E. 2d at 718. 
88223 Conn. 354, 613 A.2d 254 (1992). 
89613 A.2d at 256n. 2. 
90613 A. 2d at 258. 
91 613 A. 2d 265. 
92Id. 
93Id. 
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court then stated that it "need not determine what alternatives the board 
might have pursued." 94 The court noted the suggestion of two cases from 
the 1920's that board members with a disqualifying interest could remedy 
the problem by resigning. 9S In Clisham, this was unnecessary because the 
commissioner who had been disqualified by the court was now dead. 
Therefore, remand back to the same board was possible.96 It is 
questionable whether the court would have been as willing to reject 
application of the rule of necessity if the disqualified commissioner were 
still on the board. 
The strongest statement against the use of the rule of necessity is 
found in a dissenting opinion in a case involving revocation of an 
insurance agent's license by the Pennsylvania Commission ofIn:;urance.97 
It was alleged that the commissioner was guilty of prejudgment bias.98 
The dissenting judge voted against the application of the rule of necessity, 
and wrote: "I realize that the outcome I have suggested prevents any 
further adjudication on the propriety of [the insurance agent] Sherman's 
actions. However, what appears to be justice to the Department [of 
Insurance] in seeking to proceed further against Sherman is in reality, an 
injustice to Sherman .. .If this court does not let the Commissioner know 
that it is intolerable to use one's political position to publicly destroy an 
individual's reputation without regard for that person's due process 
rights, then such public officials will never learn. "99 
The sentiments of this dissenting judge, and the two cases just 
discussed that did not invoke the rule of necessity, are clearly the 
minority position among the states. As this article has so far established, 
the rule of necessity has been consistently adopted by state courts when 
presented with decisions by biased agency officials if no alternate 
decisionmaker is available. The rule of necessity has become a well 
established part of state administrative law. It is not the rare case that the 
doctrine is invoked. 
94Id. 
9SMiller v. Aldridge, 212 Ala. 660, 103 So. 835 (1925); Stahl v. Board of 
Supervisors, 187 Iowa 1342,175 N.W. 772 (1920). 
96613 A. 2d at 265. 
97Sherman v. Kaiser, 664 A. 2d 221 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1995). 
98"fhe allegation of prejudgment bias was based on a report prepared by the agency 
and a press release which discussed the contents ofthe report. 664 A.2d at 227. 
99664 A. 2d at 232 (1. Friedman, dissenting opinion). 
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V. Agency Attempts to Avoid the Rule of Necessity 
In a couple cases, the agency itself tried to avoid the need to rely 
on the rule of necessity, or at least minimize its impact, by seeking an 
alternative decisionmaking process. In these cases, however, the courts 
rejected the agency's attempt. 
In Stroudsburg Area School District v. Kelly,100 in an attempt to 
avoid the need to rely on the rule of necessity, the school board, after 
having voted 5-3 that it was unable to provide a fair hearing, filed a 
petition on its own behalf with the state Secretary of Education to have 
him conduct the hearing. Despite the fact that the Secretary had statutory 
authority to make a de novo review of the school board decision, the 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court required the rule of necessity be 
invoked, and ordered the full school board to hear the case. IOI The court 
said that the Secretary of Education could not be vested with initial 
jurisdiction just because the school board had declared itself biased. 102 
In Kunec v. Brea Redevelopment Agency,to3 in order to minimize 
the impact of the rule of necessity, when two members of the five person 
council had a financial interest in a pending condemnation case, and a 
vote of four out of five council members was required to pass a 
condemnation resolution, the council on its own decided to flip a coin and 
have one, but not both, conflicted members vote. 104 The California court, 
however, did not see the coin flip as a viable alternative to the rule of 
necessity. 105 
VI. Heightened Substantive Review 
Despite the widespread acceptance of the rule of necessity in state 
administrative law, there is general recognition of its unfairness, and the 
inherent tension between it and the right to an impartial decisionmaker. 
Application of the rule of necessity has been called a "regretful 
100701 A.2d at 1000 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1997). 
101 701 A. 2d at 1003. 
102Id. 
10355 Cal. App. 4th 511, 64 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1997). 
10464 Cal. Rptr. at 145. 
10564 Cal. Rptr. at 147-48. See also E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 
116 III. App. 3d 586, 451 N.E. 2d 555 (1983) where an attempt to resolve a bias problem 
without relying on the rule of necessity by having an ad hoc panel of elected officials decide 
the case was rejected because the officials had no authority to hear the matter. 
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circumstance"106 and a "choice between two evils."107 Because of the 
discomfort with the rule of necessity, many cases have adopted the 
suggestion usually attributed to Professor K. C. Davisl08 that in cases 
where the rule of necessity has been invoked, the reviewing court should 
review the agency decision with heightened scrutiny. 109 The effectiveness 
of this suggestion to minimize unfairness of the rule of necessity is 
questionable. There appears to be no case where such heightened 
scrutiny led to a result different than if traditional review was applied. I 10 
A related suggestion is for a reviewing court to employ a different 
standard of review, for example, clear or convincing evidence or de novo 
review, when it is reviewing an agency decision made by a biased agency 
acting pursuant to the rule of necessity. No court has adopted this 
approach, and it has been expressly rejected by some courts. III 
Moreover, in this author's opinion, focusing on substantive review is not 
the answer to the rule of necessity dilemma. The fact that the agency's 
findings turned out to be supported by substantial evidence does not 
establish the fairness of the hearing. I 12 
VII. Solutions to the Problem 
This article has demonstrated that the rule of necessity is a well 
I06Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F. 2d 351, 357 (10th Cir. 1936). 
I07First American Bank & Trust Company v. Ellwein, 221 N.W. 2d 509, 515 (N.D. 
1974). The rule of necessity has also been referred to as "stern." New Jersey State Board of 
Optometrists v. Nemitz, 21 N.J. Super. 18,90 A.2d 740, 750 (1952). 
1083 K. Davis, Administrative law Treatise § 19.9 (2d ed. 1980). 
109Southwestem Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma Corporation Comm., 837 P.2d 
1001, 1009 (Okla 1994); Gay v. City of Somerville, 878 S.W. 2d 124, 128 (Tenn. Ct. of App. 
1994); Adkins v. City of Tell City, 625 N.E. 2d 1298, 1304 (Ind. Ct. of App. 1993); Barker v. 
Secretary of State's Office of Missouri, 752 S.W. 2d 437, 441 (Mo. App. 1988); deKoevend 
v. Board of Education of West End School District RE-2, 688 P. 2d 219, 229 (Colo. 1984); See 
also, Board of Education, Laurel Special School District v. Shockley, 52 Del. 277, 156 A. 2d 
214 (Del. 1959); Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm., 232 Wis. 274, 287 N.W. 
122 (1939). 
110 A few cases have reserved judgment on whether heightened scrutiny is appropriate. 
See, Champion's Auto Ferry, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Comm., 231 Mich. App. 699, 
588 N.W. 2d 153, 160 (1998); General Motors Corp. v. Rosa, 82 N.W. 2d 183,624 N.E. 2d 
142, 145 n* (1993); Northeast Occupational Exchange, Inc. v. Bureau of Rehabilitation, 473 
A. 2d 406, 410 n.1O (Maine 1984). 
I liSee, Gay v. City of Somerville, 878 S.W. 2d 124, 128 (Tenn. Ct. of App. 1994); 
Barker v. Secretary of State's Office of Missouri, 752 S.W. 2d 437, 441 (Mo. App. 1988). 
112First American Bank & Trust Co. v. Ellwein, 221 N.W. 2d 509, 513 (N.D. 1974). 
XIX Journal orthe National Association of Administrative Law Judges 52 
accepted doctrine in state administrative law. Is there any chance of a 
change so that biased agency officials will be stopped from deciding 
cases in state and local administrative agencies? 
In a couple cases, it has been argued that the rule of necessity is 
unconstitutional. 113 This argument has received little attention from the 
courts. The cases easily reject this claim by citation to United States v. 
Will. I 14 Although United States v. Will dealt only with the rule of 
necessity for federal judges, it seems highly unlikely that the rule of 
necessity will be held unconstitutional as applied to state administrative 
decisionmakers. liS 
The most promising solution to the problem of the rule of 
necessity is to develop a fair, predictable method of selecting alternative 
decisionmakers for those situations where the primary decisionmakers are 
biased. It is well established that the rule of necessity is not applicable 
if there is an alternative decisionmaker who is empowered to decide the 
case. 1I6 For example, in General Motors Corp. v. Rosa,1I7 the New York 
Commissioner of the State Division of Human Rights had relied on the 
rule of necessity in deciding a discrimination case against General 
Motors. The commissioner had shortly before her appointment served as 
113See, Gay v. City of Somerville, 878 S.W. 2d 124, 128 (Tenn. Ct. of App. 1994); 
Fitzgerald v. City of Maryland Heights, 796 S.W. 2d 52, 60 (Mo. App. 1990). 
114See, Gay v. City ofSomervile, 878 S.W. 2d at 128; Fitzgerald v. City of Maryland 
Heights, 796 S.W. 2d at 60 (also citing Barker v. Secretary of State's Office 752 S.W. 2d 437, 
440-41 (Mo. App. 1988.) 
"'In Opdahl v. Zeeland Public School District No.4, 512 N.W. 2d 444 (N.D. 1994), 
the North Dakota Supreme Court was asked to "revisit the application of the rule of necessity." 
The court declined to do this because it found that there was no disqualifying bias that required 
the doctrine's application. In Ririe v. Board of Trustees of School District No. One, Crook 
County, Wyoming, 647 P. 2d 214 (Wyo. 1983), the Wyoming Supreme Court, after holding 
that there was no disqualifying has on the board's part, "reserve[d]" the question whether the 
rule of necessity permits an admittedly biased administrative board to preside at a hearing. Id. 
at 224 (footnote omitted). 
116Champion's Auto Ferry, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Comm., 231 Mich. App. 
699,588 N.W. 2d 153, 160 (1998); Hongsathavij v. Queen of Angels/Hollywood Presbyterian 
Medical Center, 62 Cal. App. 4th 1123, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 695, 707 (1998); Acme Brick Co. v. 
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 307 Ark. 363, 821 S.W. 2d 7,10 (1991); Mank v. Board of Fire 
and Police Commissioners, Granite City, 7 III. App. 3d 478, 288 N.E. 2d 49, 54 (III. App. 
1972); Rose v. State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts, 397 S. W. 2d 570, 576 (Mo. 
1965); Yuhas v. Board of Medical Examiners, 135 Mont. 381, 339 P. 2d 981, 985 (Mont. 
1959); New Jersey State Board of Optometrists v. Nemitz, 21 N.J. Super. 18,90 A.2d 740, 750 
(1952); Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F. 2d 351, 357 (10th Cir. 1936). 
11782 N.Y. 2d 183,624 N.E. 2d 142 (1993). 
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counsel on behalf of the employee filing the complaint. The New York 
Court of Appeals reversed the Commissioner's decision to decide the 
case herself, which had been adverse to General Motors, holding that 
because the New York Human Rights Law and the New York Public 
Officers law permitted appointment of a subordinate to decide the case, 
there was no necessity for the commissioner to issue the final order. I IS 
The court remanded for a new hearing before an impartial official. 
The next issue becomes, accepting that obtaining an alternative 
decisionmaker is the best way to avoid the rule of necessity, what should 
be the process for the selection of the alternate. There are various 
options, but one is clearly the best. 
One option is that the court have the power to appoint an impartial 
replacement for a biased agency decisionmaker. Although this has been 
suggested,119 it has never been adopted, and it is not the proper solution 
for a few reasons. Agencies are creatures of the legislature, not the 
courts. The appointment process lies with the executive branch, not the 
courts. Moreover, judicial appointments could only be made after a 
biased decision has been rendered and the case has made its way through 
the judicial process. It is much better to have a replacement mechanism 
that can function before a biased hearing is held. 
As opposed to looking to the courts for a solution, it is better to 
have the legislature create a procedure for appointment of replacements 
so that the rule of necessity is not necessary .120 One legislative approach 
which has been adopted in some states is based on the Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act which authorizes the Governor to appoint 
a replacement. 121 This provision has been utilized in a few reported 
cases. 122 This approach, however, has many weaknesses. First, the 
118624 N.E. 2d at 145-46. 
119Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma Corporation Comm., 873 P. 2d 
1001, 1010-29 (Okla. 19940) (dissenting opinion of Judge Opala). 
120See, Acme Brick Co. v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 307 Ark. 363, 821 S.W. 
2d 7, 11 (1991) suggesting that the legislature reconsider the absence of a procedure for 
appointment of replacements for biased board members. 
121Model State Admin. Procedure Act of 1981 §§4-202(e)-(f), 15 V.L.A. 31 (Supp. 
1991); See Michael Asimow, Toward A New California Administrative Procedure Act: 
Adjudication Fundamentals, 39 V.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1067, 1150 (1992). 
I22See, Easter House v. Dept. of Children and Family Services, 204 Ill. App. 3d 312, 
561 N.E. 2d 1266 (1990); International Harvester Co. v. Bowling, 72 Ill. App. 3d 910, 391 
N.E.2d 168 (1979); In the Matter of Rollins Environmental Services, Inc., 481 So. 2d 113 (La. 
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Governor is only authorized to appoint a replacement after the bias has 
been established. The selection process therefore will be made in the 
midst of controversy. This draws the Governor into the controversy. The 
appointee is more likely himself or herself to also be accused of some 
bias than if an alternate were in place before the need arose for a 
replacement. Related to this problem is whether the replacement is to 
come from inside or outside the agency. 123 If the replacement comes from 
within the agency, allegations of institutional bias and coziness among 
co-workers will surely arise. If the replacement comes from outside the 
agency, allegations of political pressure and lack of expertise will occur. 
It has also been suggested that it may be improper for the Governor to 
appoint a replacement when the disqualified official has been elected. 124 
Another problem with having the Governor appoint the 
replacement is that it is more desirable to have the replacement become 
involved as quickly as possible. Governors are extremely busy with a 
myriad of concerns and tasks which will lead to delay in an appointment. 
Delay will also be created by the need to screen and interview possible 
replacements. Using the Governor to select a replacement also appears 
inappropriate in local matters such as teacher and police officer discharge 
cases. 
The best solution to the problem of bias and the rule of necessity 
is a legislative requirement that any administrative case in the state that 
would require invoking the rule of necessity be decided by an 
administrative law judge who is a member of the state's central 
administrative panel (often known as the Office of Administrative 
Hearings). The use of a central panel of administrative law judges 
represents the modem trend in state agency adjudications. 125 Under such 
1985). 
I23See, In the Matter of Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. 481 So. 2d 113, 121 n. 
26 (La. 1985). 
124Michael Asimow, Toward A New California Administrative Procedure Act: 
Adjudication Fundamentals, 39 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1067, 1150 (1992). 
12SSee, John W. Hardwicke, The Central Hearing Agency: Theory and 
Implementation In Maryland, 14 J.NAALJ 5 (1994); Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: 
State Central Panels in the 1990's, 46 Admin. L. Rev. 75 (1994); Christopher B. McNeil, 
Similiarities and Difforences Between Judges In the Judicial Branch and the Executive Branch: 
The Further Evolution of Executive Adjudications Under the Administrative Central Panel, 19 
J.NAALJ I (1998); Sheila B. Taylor, The Growth and Development of a Centralized 
Administrative Hearings Process in Texas, 17 J.NAALJ 113 (1997); Malcolm C. Rich, The 
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a system, administrative law judges are organizationally attached to a 
central office in charge of holding adjudications for many state and 
possibly local agencies. Under a central panel system, the state 
administrative law judges, unlike the federal model, are not assigned to 
hear cases from one agency. 
The central panel concept has been adopted in slightly over half 
the states, and although there is variation among central panels in 
different states,126 there is general agreement among the commentators 
that central panels offer advantages over the single agency administrative 
law judge. Among the numerous advantages of a centralized panel,127 
foremost is the advantage of impartiality.128 This of course is the main 
reason to eliminate the rule of necessity. Moreover, a major advantage 
of using administrative law judges from a central panel is that the judges 
are already in place. A system that relies on central panel judges as 
substitutes for biased decisionmakers will not be subject to criticisms 
relating to delay or appointment based on political pressure or bias. 
Additionally, the concern relating to lack of expertise of substitute 
Central Panel System and the Decisionmaking Independence of Administrative Law Judges: 
Lessons For A Proposed Federal Program, 6 Western New England L. Rev. 643 (1984); 
Edwin L. Felter, Colorado's Central Panel Experience - Lessons For The Feds, 14 J.NAALJ 
95 (1994); Ronald Marquardt & Edward M. Wheat, The Developing Concept of an 
Administrative Court, 33 Admin. L. Rev. 301 (1981); Duane R. Harves, The 1981 Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act: The Impact in Central Panel States, 64 Western New Eng. L. 
Rev. 661 (1984); Harold Levinson, The Central Panel System: A Framework that Separates 
ALJ's from Administrative Agencies, 65 Judicature 236 (1981). . 
126See, e.g., Malcolm L. Rich, supra note 124; Harold Levinson, supra note 124; Alan 
Hoberg, supra note 124. 
127The advantages of central panels of administrative law judges include efficiency 
of decisionmaking which saves costs and leads to quicker resolution of cases; avoiding burnout 
of administrative law judges who get to decide cases involving various issues from various 
agencies; strengthening the appearance of justice by separating prosecutorial and investigative 
functions from the decisionmaking process; permitting adoption of uniform rules of 
administrative procedure; better reasoned decisions; better evaluation of administrative law 
judges; better recruitment of administrative law judges by providing diversification; reducing 
exparte communications between agency and administrative law judges; and increased prestige 
for administrative law judges. See authorities cited in note 124 supra. See also Michael 
Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California Administrative Agencies, 
42 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1157 (1995); Lori K. Endris & Wayne E. Penrod, Judicial Independence 
In Administrative Adjudication: Indiana's Environmental Solution, 12 St. John's 1. of Legal 
Commentary 125 (1996). 
128See e.g., Malcolm Rich supra note 124; and Duane R. Harves, supra note 124. See 
also Judith K. Meierhenry, The Due Process Right to An Unbiased Adjudicator 1n 
Administrative Proceedings, 36 S.D.L. Rev. 551 (1991). 
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decisionmakers is diminished when judges from central panels are used 
because such administrative law judges routinely decide cases from 
various agencies dealing with many different areas of law. The very 
adoption by a state legislature of a central administrative law judge panel 
is a legislative decision that impartiality and fairness override 
considerations of expertise. 129 Central panels can also be authorized to 
hear issues from local boards.I3O The use of central panel judges is also 
consistent with the Model State Administrative Procedure Act approach 
which authorizes the Governor to appoint a substitute decision maker131 
in that the Governor typically controls the appointment of central panel 
administrative law judges through the Governor's selection of the chief 
administrative law judge. 132 
It would appear that it is essential that the central panel alternative 
to the rule of necessity be mandatory, and not just an available option. 
This is illustrated by Regan v. Maryland Board of Chiropractic 
Examiners133 which involved a disciplinary proceeding against a 
chiropractor. Although the case revolved mostly around the 
chiropractor's alleged assisting the unauthorized practice of chiropracty, 
also involved were allegations that while the Board's investigation was 
ongoing, Dr. Regan, the target of the investigation, asked two women to 
have a sexual affair with two members of the Board so that Regan "could 
have something to use against the Board."134 Regan first sought to 
disqualify these two board members. Regan also sought to disqualify 
other board members because he intended to call one as a witness, and 
12~dward Tomlinson, The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act: Forty Years Old 
In 1997, 56 Md. L. Rev. 196,253 (1997). 
130 See, e.g., Annotated Code of Maryland, State Government § 9-1604 (b)(I)(ii) 
giving the chief administrative law judge the power to furnish administrative law judges on a 
contractual basis to other governmental entities. See also, Annotated Code of Maryland, 
Crimes and Punishment, Art. 27, Section 225(c)(u)(2) authorizing Maryland Office of 
Administrative Hearings to hear cases from Washington County Gaming Commission. 
131Model State Admin. Procedure Act of 1981 §§ 4-202(e)-(t), 15 V.L.A. 31 (Supp. 
1991). 
132See e.g. Annotated Code of Maryland, State Government § 9-1603 (a) (chief 
administrative law judge appointed by Governor with advice and consent of the State), and § 
9-1604 which gives the chief administrative law judge the power to appoint administrative law 
judges. 
133 120 Md. App. 494, 707 A.2d 891 (1998) affirmed, 355 Md. 397, 735 A. 2d 991 
(1999). 
134707 A. 2d at 894. 
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because two had a financial interest in having Regan lose his license 
because Regan's practice was within the same geographic area as 
theirs.13S 
Regan argued that because the disqualification of the members he 
sought would make it impossible for the Board to convene a quorum, the 
case should be delegated to the Maryland Office of Administrative 
Hearings (OAH) which is the central panel of administrative law judges 
in Maryland. 136 The court rejected this argument because the delegation 
of cases to the Maryland OAH from the Board of Chiropractic Examiners 
was discretionary, not mandatory. 137 
The Maryland court's preference for the rule of necessity over 
referral to OAH was unfortunate. To avoid a conclusion such as the 
one in Regan, referrals to the central panel should be made mandatory in 
situations where the other alternative is application of the rule of 
necessity. 
The central panel solution to the rule of necessity is superior to 
merely delegating the decisionmaking power to a subordinate official 
within the same agency for all the reasons discussed by various 
commentators why central panels are superior to the traditional system of 
having subordinate officials within an agency decide cases from that 
agency.138 Because New York State does not have a central panel of 
administrative law judges, the New York Court of Appeals' solution in 
General Motors, Corp. v. Rosa139 was better than applying the rule of 
necessity, but delegation within the same agency does not satisfy the 
fairness concerns as does referral to a central panel. States that do not 
have a central panel of administrative law judges should consider· 
adopting a central panel. This article provides an additional justification 
for such adoption. At the least, if a state is unwilling to adopt a full 
central panel system, the legislature should establish a "Rule of Necessity 
Central Panel" to decide cases which would otherwise be decided by 
biased agency officials. 
mId. 
136707 A. 2d at 896. 
137707 A. 2d at 900. 
138See authorities in notes 124-127. 
139See discussion accompanying notes 116-117 supra. 
XIX Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 58 
Conclusion 
The rule of necessity has become a mainstay of state 
administrative law. This is unfortunate because biased agency 
decisionmakers are antithical to a fair administrative process. Mandatory 
use of administrative law judges from central panels to avoid the need to 
invoke the rule of necessity should be adopted as the solution to end 
reliance on the rule of necessity in state administrative law. 
